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Almost immediately after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the
United States and the European Union (EU) started a battle over Passenger
Name Records (PNR). After the attacks, the United States began to assign
2risk-assessment ratings to all travelers entering and exiting the country. As
part of this risk assessment, the United States gathered passenger information,
in the form of PNRs, from airline records.3  This information was shared
among domestic and international law-enforcement agencies as part of a data-
sharing agreement.4  Despite an ostensible motivation to collaborate on the
+ Arthur Rizer works as a trial attorney at the United States Department of Justice. In addition,
Mr. Rizer is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. The views in
this Article are not those of the Department of Justice or Georgetown Law Center. The author
would like to thank his family for their support. He would also like to thank Melodie Bales, Leah
Branch, Christina Downs, Craig Nadeau, Nicole Picard, Kristen Sinisi, and the staff of the
Catholic University Law Review for their hard work on this Article.
1. See Matthew R. VanWasshnova, Note, Data Protection Conflicts Between the United
States and the European Union in the War on Terror: Lessons Learned from the Existing System
ofFinancial Information Exchange, 69 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 827, 833 (2007).
2. D. Richard Rasmussen, Is International Travel Per Se Suspicion of Terrorism? The
Dispute Between the United States and European Union over Passenger Name Record Data
Transfers, 26 WIS. INT'L L.J. 551, 551 (2008).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 551-52.
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agreement, "the United States and the European Union have struggled to find
common legal justification for PNR transfers."5 Specifically, after the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) struck the data-sharing agreement between
the European Union and the United States, a small legal-war regarding the use
and sharing of PNRs erupted between data-privacy advocates and national-
security promoters who believe security interests trump privacy concerns.6
On December 25, 2009, amid this data-sharing conflict, Umar Farouk Abdul
Mutallab attempted to detonate plastic explosives that were concealed in his
underwear while on an airplane.7 Mutallab travelled freely to Amsterdam from
Nigeria and then to Detroit aboard Northwest Airlines Flight 253. This failed
attack sheds new light on the discussion of PNR-sharing and raises the
question of whether the limitations on PNR-sharing enabled an attack like this
to happen. Indeed, the December 25th attempted attack "is a vivid reminder
that terrorists will stop at nothing to kill Americans."9  And, as Valerie
Caproni, General Counsel to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stated,
"the attempted bombing on December 25th was a failure to connect dots that
probably could have been connected." 0
This Article will explore the legal history of PNR-sharing starting from
September 11, 2001 to the signing of the new sharing agreement dated July 23,
2007. In addition, this Article will discuss the roots of the PNR conflict,
focusing on the conflicting approaches the United States and the European
Union take regarding privacy issues and how these approaches led to the
discord over PNRs. Discovering the roots of this conflict is particularly
important in order for the two governments to avoid future tension.
This Article will also survey the upcoming challenges to the current
agreement and the new PNR laws on the horizon," and address how the
Lisbon Treaty may affect this issue. Last, this Article will scrutinize the new
agreement between the United States and the European Union, specifically
5. Id. at 552.
6. See infra Part III.B-C.
7. Elise Labott et al., Al Qaeda Link Investigated as Clues Emerge in Foiled Terror Attack,
CNN.CoM (Dec. 29, 2009, 11:36 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/12/28/airline.
terror.attempt/index.html.
8. Id; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., to Sen. Mitchell McConnell
(Feb. 3, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/cjs/docs/ag-letter-2-3-I0.pdf (describing the
detention, interrogation, and decision to charge Mutallab).
9. Audio Recording: Ivan K. Fong, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Address
at the 5th Annual Homeland Security Law Institute Conference (Mar. 3, 2010) (on file with the
American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice).
10. Audio Recording: Valerie E. Caproni, Gen. Counsel, Fed. Bureau of Investigation,
Address at the ABA 5th Annual Homeland Security Law Institute Conference (Mar. 4, 2010) (on
file with the ABA Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice). Ms. Caproni also
stated that the dots could have been connected "with the benefit of hindsight 20/20." Id
I1. See PNR (Passenger Name Record) Scheme Proposed to Place Under Surveillance All
Travel in and out ofthe EU, STATEWATCH.ORG, http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/nov/01eu-
pnr.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) [hereinafter PNR Scheme].
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questioning if the agreement properly balances personal-data security with
national-security concerns or whether it allows for more situations like Umar
Farouk Abdul Mutallab's in the name of privacy.
I. CONFLICTING PHILOSOPHIES ON PRIVACY: UNITED STATES V. EUROPEAN
UNION
The protection of privacy rights is a global issue faced by all nations.12 The
drama that played out between the United States and the European Union over
PNR-data transfers is a prominent example of the clash between conflicting
philosophies on privacy protection.
The tension between the United States and Europe stems from the essence of
how the two sovereigns perceive the issue of privacy protection.14 Both the
United States and the European Union view privacy as a fundamental right, yet
their approaches to protecting this right differ significantly.15 One U.S. official
12. Steven R. Salbu, The European Union Data Privacy Directive and Internal Relations,
35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 655, 665 (2002). But see Press Release, Eur. Parliament, EU
Passenger Name Record Talks on Hold in Council Until Lisbon Treaty is Ratified (June 10, 2009)
[hereinafter Press Release, Passenger Name Record Talks on Hold], available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRESS&reference=200
900910061PR61955.
13. See Salbu, supra note 12, at 665. There is a "difference in attitude between the EU and
the US surrounding the area of protection of rights and civil liberties, extra caution is needed
when concluding agreements that allow for the personal data of EU citizens to be transferred from
the EU to the US." SHARON NOLAN, CTR. OF EUR. STUDIES, UNIV. OF LIMERICK, EU SECURITY
VERSUS CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE CASE OF PNR DATA TRANSFER 2 (2006) (on file with author).
14. Carter Manny, EU Privacy and U.S. Security: The Tension between EU Data Protection
Law and U.S. Efforts to Use Airline Passenger Data to Fight Terrorism and Other Crimes I
(undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Europe's view is that privacy "laws
reflect the view that privacy is a fundamental human right which governments are obligated to
protect. This protection applies not only to use of the data within Europe, but to international
transfers to countries outside the EU." Id. The United States, on the other hand, contains "a
patchwork of state and federal constitutional, statutory and regulatory provisions most of which
apply to a limited range of commercial activities. In many instances, either because of the
absence of legal rights, or because of the nature of the legal provisions themselves, the U.S.
system looks to the individual to take action to protect his or her personal information." Id; see
also NOLAN, supra note 13, at 3-4 ("[T]he fundamental difficulty in the negotiations as being the
'major differences in the philosophy of personal data between the US and Europe'. [sic] Europe
adheres to much stricter supervision and control on the use of personal data. This elemental
difference in philosophy was evident in the attitude of the US negotiators."). Contra Michael
Chertoff, Transatlantic Convergence Passenger Data Questions, EUR. AFF. (2008),
http://www.europeaninstitute.org/Winter/Spring-2008/transatlantic-convergence-passenger-data-
questions.html ("Differences in approach [to PNR transfers] do exist, largely rooted in culture,
geography and history. But their importance and weight have been exaggerated and are now
declining in practice. What I've witnessed is a growing convergence among nations-especially
among our transatlantic partners-in the battle against terrorism.").
15. Nicole M. Buba, Note, Waging War Against Identity Theft: Should the United States
Borrow from the European Union's Battalion?, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 633, 641
(2000) (noting that, although the United States generally "prefers self-regulation for the private
sector combined with sectoral legislation for the public sector," the European Union prefers to
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recently noted concerning PNR transfers that, because the United States and
the European Union look at privacy differently, the United States is in
persistent, intense negotiation battles with the European Union over this
issue. 16 Many in the European legal community argue that, compared to
international standards, the United States takes a laissez faire approach to
privacy law.17 Specifically, critics of the American system argue that it is
"sectoral" in its approach, concentrating on a handful of data areas such as
medical records or electronic surveillance.' 8 However, "most areas of personal
data [are] process[ed] largely unregulated."19
establish "governmental departments charged with implementing and upholding omnibus data
protection regulations"). Since the Second World War, numerous multilateral declarations
concerning privacy as a basic human right have been made. Manny, supra note 14; see, e.g.,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (111) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(I) (Dec.
10, 1948); Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, E.T.S. No. 108 art. 1 (1981); Council of Europe,
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, E.T.S. No. 005, art.
8, (1950); Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Sept. 23, 1980), available at
http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en 2649_34255_1815186_1_1 1_1 ,oo&&en-USS_01
DBC.html.
16. Fong, supra note 9.
17. Tanya L. Forsheit, et al. Privacy, Data Security and Outsourcing, 946 PLI/PAT 11, 17
(2008). The United States has
separate statutes which apply to the public and private sectors. The federal Privacy Act
applies only to data held by the federal government. Its provisions have much in
common with the European system. There is a purpose limitation which provides that
information gathered for one purpose should not be used for another without the data
subject's consent. ... However, because the Privacy Act does not confer rights on non-
resident aliens, it would not be helpful to most Europeans who might be concerned
about their passenger data in the hands of the federal government.
Manny, supra note 14, at 3 (footnote omitted) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000)).
18. Beth Givens, Privacy Expectations in a High Tech World, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 347, 348 (2000). The United States has applied this sectoral approach to
privacy protection in other areas, such as credit reporting, Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15
U.S.C. § 1681 (2006); financial matters, Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§
3401-3422 (2006); consumer protection regarding telephone service, Telephone Consumer
Protection Act of 1991, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006); video privacy, Video Privacy Protection Act of
1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006); education, Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,
20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006); and consumer protection regarding cable service, Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. §§ 521-559.
19. Forsheit et al., supra note 17. Some commentators explain that
[b]ecause the First Amendment grants us an explicit right to discuss, print, or post on-
line most information we have about others, without any express exception for speech
that might intrude on someone's claimed privacy, the text of the First Amendment
elevates free speech interests above privacy concerns. As such, our Constitution
actually protects would-be privacy violators more explicitly than potential victims of
privacy breaches.
Id; see also Givens, supra note 18, at 349 (discussing the "large gaps" that the United States'
approach has left in terms of protecting individuals' privacy).
[Vol. 60:7780
2010] The International Battle over Airline Passenger Name Records
European nations, on the other hand, claim to "have a 'vision' regarding
privacy rights" and take privacy considerations very seriously; 20 some
countries have even amended their constitutions to expressly guarantee
privacy.21 The visceral stress given to privacy "may be attributable in part to
Third Reich abuses in tracking its target groups with invasive data-collection
methods."22  An instructor at the Washington State Police Academy, from
where the author of this Article graduated in 1999, echoed this theory
concerning the Nazi regime. The instructor was part of an exchange program
with Germany, and one of the major differences he noted between European
and American law-enforcement approaches pertained to data collection,
specifically that conducted by police in the United States. In Germany, an
officer could stop a vehicle for almost any reason and beat the occupant for the
slightest of transgressions, 23 but the officer could not write down the offender's
name unless he was formally arrested. The instructor explained that, in the
United States, an officer must have a "reasonably articulable suspicion" to pull
a car over and he cannot rough up a rude passenger. However, the instructor
found it amazing that an officer could ask anybody for his or her name and
other personal information, write it down, and store that information in a
database. The instructor believed that this fundamental difference in attitude
between Europeans and Americans was rooted in the use of death lists and
domestic spying both in Nazi Germany and in Soviet-ruled Eastern Europe.
As a result of Europe's past, the European Union has enacted broad,
prophylactic "omnibus data protection laws covering the full spectrum of uses
of personally identifiable information."24 This resolute attitude toward data
security has made data-security laws more comprehensive, reaching
"seemingly innocuous databases such as telephone books, restaurant
reservations systems, and personal weblogs." 25
In contrast, the United States' sectoral approach is more reactive in nature.
Moreover, the United States allows the market to decide how much privacy is
20. Salbu, supra note 12, at 666.
21. Id. at 666-67.
22. Id. at 666; see also Virginia Keyder, Someone in Brussels Should Listen to Ireland,
EUOBSERVER.COM (Nov. 26, 2008), http://euobserver.com/22/27181 ("Personal data protection
law first arose in Germany, based on a belief that the facility with which pre-war abuses of human
rights were carried out was at least partly attributable to the excessive accumulation of personal
data by the Nazi regime . . . .").
23. Note that the instructor said this with a sense of drama to make the story more
interesting.
24. Givens, supra note 18, at 348-49.
25. Forsheit et al., supra note 17; see also Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 31-
32 [hereinafter Council Directive 95/46/EC] (establishing a uniform standard for the protection of
personal information among the EU member states).
8 1
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needed, and the public generally has limited statutory rights.26 This self-
regulation approach27 is of great concern to privacy-rights advocates because it
does not provide an opportunity for the consumer to consent to the data28
practices of businesses before his information is disseminated.
Although Nazi terror may be at the heart of why European states have a high
concern about privacy rights,29 for the United States, the underlying origin of
the "jurisprudential gulf separating the American 'sectoral' approach to
privacy regulation from other countries' comprehensive sweep" has roots in
the country's founding document. 30  Indeed, because the First Amendment
guarantees the right to talk about others by word of mouth, through print, or
online, without an exception for speech that violates an individual's right to
privacy, the First Amendment trumps privacy concerns.3 1  As such, the
"Constitution actually protects would-be privacy violators more explicitly than
potential victims of privacy breaches." 32 Moreover, it is interesting to note that
nowhere in the Constitution or the Declaration of Independence is the word
"privacy" or an equivalent word used.
Conversely, in Europe, "[r]ather than put privacy interests on a scale
counterbalanced by free speech rights, these countries analogize privacy rights
with intellectual property rights." 34  Stemming from this logic, if the
"government is going to let corporations keep competitors from exploiting
brand-names and trademarks, the law certainly should allow a citizen to keep
others from trafficking in his credit history, sex life and other personal
information." 35 The realization of this philosophy in Europe was set forth in
the European Union Data Privacy Directive, passed in 1995.36 This directive
26. Nikhil S. Palekar, Privacy Protection: When Is "Adequate" Actually Adequate?, 18
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 549, 549 (2008); see also COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY:
DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 2-4 (1992)
(lobbying for a new comprehensive policy program to "break away from the confines of
sectorization"); FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 101-02, 109, 131-32 (1997)
(arguing for the U.S. government to enact "a single, omnibus privacy law," because the United
States' current protection is inadequate).
27. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as
Personal Information Protectors, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 55, 72-73 (2007); Pelekar, supra note 26, at
549-50.
28. See Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV.
J.L. &TECH. 149, 172, 179 (2001).
29. See Keyder, supra note 22 ("Personal data protection law first arose in Germany, based
on a belief that the facility with which pre-war abuses of human rights were carried out was at
least partly attributable to the excessive accumulation of personal data by the Nazi regime .....
30. Forsheit et al., supra note 17, at 17.
31. Id.
32. Id
33. See generally U.S. CONST.; THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
34. Forsheit et al., supra note 17, at 18.
35. Id
36. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 25.
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requires each EU member state to enact a data-protection law that covers
government, private, and business entities.3 7
This brings up the central question in this debate: did the conflicting
attitudes toward data privacy allow a terrorist like Umar Farouk Abdul
Mutallab to board Northwest Airlines Flight 253? In order to answer that
question, the history of the debate must be flushed out to understand the
backdrop of the problem.
II. HISTORY OF THE LEGAL CONFLICT
To fully understand the dynamics of the United States' and the European
Union's struggle over PNRs, it is necessary to understand the past of the two
sovereigns. Thus, this section will examine the history of the legal battle
concerning data privacy.
A. September 11, 2001: Everything Changes
Beyond the death and destruction that the United States witnessed on
September 11, 2001, Americans were awakened to the idea that their right to
privacy and their freedom to move throughout the country had helped the
enemy knock down the World Trade Center and scar the Pentagon.38  In
addition to deploying the military to fight those responsible for 9/11, the
United States recognized that "one of the chief battles of the war on terrorism
has been with ourselves, determining to what extent rights and freedoms will
be curbed in an effort to save lives."39 The United States was not the only
country to be shaken awake by 9/11; at the Extraordinary European Council
37. Id
38. Ron Wyden, Law and Policy Efforts to Balance Security, Privacy and Civil Liberties in
Post 9/11 America, 17 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 331, 331 (2006); see NAT'L COMM'N ON
TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 383-94 (2004) [hereinafter
9/11 Report], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/91 I/index.html. In addition to the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
(PATRIOT Act), which amended several laws including the ability to collect personal data. Elec.
Privacy Info. Ctr., USA PATRIOT Act, EPIC.ORG, http:/ www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/
usapatriot/default.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
At the end of the twentieth century, there was relatively little public concern in the U.S.
about government use of personal information and much more apprehension about
commercial use of data. Accordingly, privacy protection was considered to be more a
matter of consumer protection rather than of human rights.
The terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, changed this. Security
suddenly became an overriding concern. Some people in government believed that
information technology in general, and data mining practices in particular, could help
detect terrorist activity and improve the general safety of the public, the security of the
border and the safety of air travel.
Manny, supra note 14; see also Keyder, supra note 22 (discussing the impact of 9/11 on data-
privacy protection in the European Union).
39. Wyden, supra note 38, at 331.
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Meeting on September 21, 2001, the European Union's Heads of States
prioritized the war on terror as a main objective of the European Union and
"pledged its support to the US 'in bringing to justice and punishing the
perpetrators, sponsors and accomplices' of terrorism and issued an action plan
against terrorism that contained a broad blue-print of EU counterterrorism
activities." 40
The either-or paradigm that many proffer concerning privacy and securi71
has proven unrealistic and ultimately protects neither privacy nor security.
To that end, 9/11 brought a new reality, which cannot "be met simply with
heightened vigilance on both 'sides' of a stark equation. Those who bear the
responsibility to put security first must understand that if civil liberties are not
prominent among their concerns, their efforts may diminish the uniquely
American freedoms they seek to protect." 42 At the same time, defenders of
privacy must understand that a proliferation of successful terrorist attacks
would weaken the ver foundation of the American experience-to prosper
and pursue happiness. Therefore, in order to guarantee the security and the
freedom of all Americans, and Europeans for that matter, leaders must embrace
an essential principle: "the security of the nation and the protection of
individual freedoms are not, and must not be drawn as, mutually exclusive."44
Because commercial airlines were the weapons Al Qaeda used on September
11, 2001, the United States took an immediate interest determining who was
entering the nation via passenger airplanes. 45  Hence, in response to the
terrorist attacks and this new interest, Congress passed and President H. W.
Bush signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), 4  a law
40. NOLAN, supra note 13.
41. See Wyden, supra note 38.
42. Id "It is difficult to speak about privacy in the United States today without considering
the significance of September 11. That day has had a profound impact on the public perception
of privacy. . . ." Marc Rotenberg, Privacy and Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1115, 1115 (2002).
43. Wyden, supra note 38, at 331.
44. Id.
Balancing security, privacy, and civil liberties in federal policy is not a finite task; it is
a perpetual struggle with a many-headed Hydra. Difficult questions will seldom be
permanently settled, and new, uncharted ambiguities will continually arise as
America's anti-terrorism efforts evolve. Since no one solution will end the debate, the
best approach for policymakers is to apply intellectual rigor to each new dilemma.
Thoughtful leaders will be guided by two bedrock principles: that concerns for security
and privacy must be approached in tandem, with neither relegated to an afterthought;
and that if a proposed solution abandons one goal for the other, a different solution
must be sought.
Id. at 352.
45. Rasmussen, supra note 2, at 567.
46. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of49 U.S.C.). With the ATSA, the United States will
collect information on ten to eleven million passengers every year-a sheer volume of data
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that was specifically written to target and prevent future terrorist attacks
similar to those by Umar Farouk Abdul Mutallab.4 7
B. November 11, 2001: The Aviation and Transportation Security Act
One of the first actions that Congress took through the ATSA in response to
9/11 was to federalize airport security. 48 As part of this security takeover,
Congress required all airlines to provide manifests of passenger data-PNRs-
to the U.S. Customs Service in order to compile profiles to combat terrorism.49
The consequences for failing to provide the required information were fines or
the revocation of the ability of those airlines to land at airports in the United
States.so
Specifically, the ATSA required airlines to gather passenger data on all
commercial flights that would fly in U.S. airspace. ' The required PNR had to
include the "name, age, country of origin, height and weight, [and] race" of the
passengers. 52 In addition, the PNR also was required to contain the location of
where the passenger was going to stay in the United States, his or her visa
information, and any data from the passenger's purchase of the flight "such as
email addresses, credit card numbers, telephone numbers, [and even] dietary
beneficial as not only as a general intelligence gathering mechanism, but also as a measure to
increase aviation security. NOLAN, supra note 13, at 4.
47. See 49 U.S.C. § 44910 (2006).
48. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG No. 04-37,
AUDIT OF PASSENGER AND BAGGAGE SCREENING PROCEDURES AT DOMESTIC AIRPORTS 3-4
(2004), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_04-37_0904.pdf.
49. 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c) (2006). The Department of Homeland Security is also permitted
to regulate aircrafts coming to or leaving the United States and demand certain travel documents
from passengers under 19 U.S.C. § 1433(c)-(e) (2006). Indeed, all aircrafts must provide
advance notification, report their arrival, and meet necessary landing requirements. Id. § 1433(c).
In addition, the Customs Service may require an aircraft to provide certain "information, data,
documents, papers, or manifests," as deemed necessary. Id § 1433(d). Moreover, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (lRTPA) of 2004 required that the Department
of Homeland Security implement a plan to screen passengers and crews of aircraft entering or
departing the country. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, § 4012, 118 Stat. 3638, 3714-19 (2004). However, even before IRTPA, airlines had to
send an en route electronic transmission with passenger and crew manifests. CBP Proposes
Predeparture Passenger and Crew Manifests, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1568, 1568 (2006).
50. 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.14(d)(4), 122.161 (2003).
51. 49 U.S.C. § 44909(c). In addition to gathering passenger information, the 9/11
Commission recommended the expansion of "no-fly" lists and the increase of information sharing
among federal agencies. 9/11 Report, supra note 38, at 393, 417-18; see also Peter P. Swire,
Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism, 51 VILL. L. REv. 951, 951 (2006)
(discussing how the 9/11 Commission advocated information sharing for security purposes).
52. DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE UNITED
STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION 141 (2005).
85
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preferences."53  The information, once transmitted to the authorities, was
entered into a computer system that screened the data for potential terrorists. 54
Because most airlines did not have their own databases for passenger
information, most passenger information was stored in a Computerized
Reservation System (CRS)."5  The CRS held this data indefinitely, even if the
passenger canceled his or her flight.56
C. May 28, 2004: Agreement to Transfer
In the past several years, the European Union has developed stringent
privacy laws.57  One such law, Directive 95/46, set out to create European-
wide data-protection laws, which included minimum standards with respect to
privacy-protection guarantees for each member state. With the exce tion of
France, all EU member states have adopted Directive 95/46." The
consequences for noncompliance with the Directive are high and range from
severe fines to criminal penalties.60 For example, in Spain, authorities can levy
a fine of between £600 and C60,100 for a minor data-infraction, between
£60,100 and C300,500 for moderate infractions, and between C300,550 and
C600,000 for serious breaches.61 In Germany and Denmark, among
53. Id. The PNR also includes residential and business addresses; emergency contacts;
hotel reservations; car rental, cruise, and other travel service information; disabilities; and
medical conditions. ELEC. INFO. PRIVACY CTR., PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS 2005: AN
INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF PRIVACY LAWS AND DEVELOPMENTS 80-81 (2005) [hereinafter
PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS]. There also exists PNR data on individuals who have never flown
before. Edward Hasbrouck, What's in a Passenger Name Record (PNR)?, THE PRACTICAL
NOMAD, http://hasbrouck.org/articles/PNR.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
54. HEISENBERG, supra note 52; see also Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact
Sheet: US-EU Passenger Name Record Agreement Signed (May 28, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press release_0421.shtm (discussing an agreement between
the United States and the European Union regarding the use of PNR data).
55. PRIVACY & HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 53, at 81.
56. Hasbrouck, supra note 53.
57. See Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 25.
58. Id. at 31-32. In the European Union, directives serve to secure uniformity of member-
state laws. KLAUS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAW 65 (5th ed. 2000),
available at http://ec.europa.eulpublications/booklets/eudocumentation/02/txt en.pdf.
59. ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW - CASES AND MATERIALS 325 (2007) ("France was one of the
last to adopt revisions to bring its existing Data Protection Act into compliance with the
Directive . . . . However, this recently adopted bill has yet to be approved by the French
Constitutional Council and may face further modifications ... ").
60. See infra text accompanying notes 61-62. The Directive specifically allows each
member state to determine its own punishment for noncompliance. Council Directive 45/46/EC,
supra note 25, art. 24, at 45.
61. Ley Orgdnica de Protecci6n de Datos de Cardcter Personal [Organic Law on the
Protection of Personal Data] art. 45 (B.O.E. 1999, 298) (Spain), available at
http://www.boe.es/boe/dias/1999/12/14/index.php (follow "PDF" hyperlink). This is a significant
amount of money; as of October 2010, E600,000 translates to $837,382.56. XE: The World's
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other EU states, a violator could face criminal penalties for privacy
violations.62
The ATSA put European-based airlines in direct legal conflict with their
own Directive 95/46, sparking a transatlantic legal-dispute.63 The airlines that
complied with ATSA by transferring passenger data violated EU privacy
laws;64 however, refusal to transmit the data to U.S. authorities meant facing
fines and the possible revocation of landing rights. 65
The United States and the European Union engaged in talks to resolve the
conflict for over a year66 and met in Brussels in February of 2003 to finally
parley an agreement.67 Although the talks between the United States and the
European Union failed to reach a comprehensive agreement that resolved the
dispute,68 the two parties were able to release a joint statement that detailed
their progress and announced that an agreement was on the horizon.69 On
Favorite Currency Site, http://www.xe.com (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). As euros have replaced
pesetas as Spain's currency, peseta amounts listed in the Organic Law have been converted for
illustrative purposes. See After 134 Years the Peseta Was Replaced by the Euro, LA CERCA (Oct.
15, 2008), http://en.lacerca.com/news/reportajes/134_years_peseta replacedeuro-28547-I.html.
For the mechanism used to verify currency translations, see Coinmill.com - The Currency
Converter, http://coinmill.com/ESP calculator.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
62. BUNDESDATENSCHUTZGESETZ [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act], Dec. 20, 1990,
BGBL. I § 43 (Ger.) (as amended Sept. 14, 1994), available at http://www.iuscomp.
org/gla/statutes/BDSG.htm; Act on Processing of Personal Data, Act No. 429, May 31, 2000, ch.
18, paras. 69-71 (Den.) (as amended), available at http://www.datatilsynet.dk/english/the-act-on-
processing-of-personal-data/read-the-act-on-processing-of-personal-data/the-act-on-processing-
of-personal-data/. A violator in Germany could be sentenced to two years imprisonment if
proven that the violator's release of information was for monetary or personal gain, or to harm
another. BDSG § 43. In Denmark, a violator who is a corporation could lose its right to do
business. Act on Processing of Personal Data § 71.
63. See HEISENBERG, supra note 52, at 139-40. An illustration of this dispute follows:
Following a trip to the US on 26 March 2003, a legal challenge to the interim
agreement which resulted from the February talks was taken by a Spanish citizen who
was unhappy with the fact that Iberia transferred his PNR data without legal standing.
In May 2003, civil rights defenders, European Digital Rights (EDRI) launched a
campaign to [sic] against the illegal transfer of European travellers' [sic] data to the
US.
NOLAN, supra note 13, at 6-7 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 140.
65. Id. at 140-41. Notably, this conflict confused many in the security sector because
personal data that concerned public security and defense were considered exempt from the
European Directive. Id at 142. However, because PNRs were compiled for the commercial
purpose of flying and only subsequently became relevant for national-security purposes, the
exemption did not apply. See id. Thus, "[h]ypothetically, if the data had been collected only for
security purposes, they likely would have fallen under the security exemptions ..... Id
66. Id. at 142.
67. Joint Statement, European Commission/US Customs Talk on PNR Transmission (Feb.
17-18, 2003) [hereinafter Joint Statement], available at http://ec.europa.eu/transportlair portal/
security/doc/prnjoint declaration en.pdf.
68. See HEISENBERG, supra note 52, at 142-43.
69. Joint Statement, supra note 67.
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December 16, 2003, the European Commission on Data Protection and Privacy
Matters issued a report to the EU Council and Parliament that outlined its
approach to transfer PNRs to the United States. 70 The Commission's report
proffered a system wherein the United States would agree to: 1) only require
thirty-four pieces of information with every PNR; 2) destroy sensitive data; 3)
only use the PNR to prevent terrorism or other related crimes; 4) only retain
the PNR for three and one-half years; 5) allow involvement of EU privacy
authorities; and 6) participate in an annual review of the agreement.n
On May 14, 2004, the European Commission found that the United States
72
had given proper assurances that it would protect PNR data. As a result, on
May 17, 2004, the EU Council approved the conclusion of the Commission.
Subsequently, on May 28, 2004, the United States and the European Union
signed an agreement concerning the transfer of PNRs that followed the
Commission's September 16, 2003 report.74
D. May 30, 2006: The European Court ofJustice Rejects the Agreement
On July 27, 2004, the European Parliament appealed to the ECJ asking the
court to annul the EU Council's decision that found that the United States had
given the proper assurances. Specifically, the Parliament argued that
70. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the Parliament - Transfer of
Air Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data: A Global EU Approach, at 4, COM (2003) 826 final
(Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/adequacy/apis-
communication/apis en.pdf.
71. Id. The report also distinguished between a system of data transfers in which the
airlines would transmit data to the United States, and a system in which the European Union
would control and filter the data the United States could access. Id. The Commission strongly
advocated for the latter system. Id.
72. Commission Decision on the Adequate Protection of Personal Data Contained in the
Passenger Name Record of Air Passengers Transferred to the United States' Bureau of Customs
and Border Protection 2004/535/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 235) 11, 13.
73. Council Decision 2004/496/EC, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 183) 83, 83.
74. Press Release, European Commission, International Agreement on Passenger Name
Records (PNR) Enters into Force (May 28, 2004), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press
ReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/694&format-HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage
=en.
75. Press Release, European Court of Justice, The Court Annuls the Council Decision
Concerning the Conclusion of an Agreement Between the European Community and the United
States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Personal Data and the Commission Decision
on the Adequate Protection of Those Data (May 30, 2006) [hereinafter European Court of
Justice], available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp06/aff/cpO60046en.pdf. The
European Parliament, which is elected by citizens, shares power with the European Council. The
European Parliament, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/parliament/indexen.htm (last
visited Oct. 12, 2010). The Parliament shares its power over the budget with the Council, but the
Parliament can "adopt or reject the budget in its entirety." Id. Although the Council is
considered on equal footing with the Parliament, "[i]n some fields (for example agriculture,
economic policy, visas and immigration), the Council alone legislates, but it has to consult
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adoption of the decision on adequacy was ultra vires, because the EU Council
did not have the authority to make the agreement and fundamental rights had
been infringed. The ECJ, on May 30, 2006, accepted the Parliament's
petition and annulled both the Council's decision and the Commission's report
that found the United States' assurances adequate." The ECJ gave the
interested parties until September 30, 2006, to establish a new agreement.78
In ruling against the Commission's report, the ECJ reasoned that, under
European law, the PNR data did not fall within the exception for data
collection for security or defense purposes.79 This was chiefly because PNR
data was not collected by the airlines for security or defense reasons, but rather
for commercial purposes; thus, the security-defense exception reasoning cited
in the Commission's report did not apply.80
In permitting the transfer of the PNR to the United States, the European
Council cited to authority under article 25 of the Data Directive that allowed
for the transfer of data to third countries if the country could provide adequate
assurances that the data would be protected. However, like the decision
against the Commission, the ECJ found that, because the underlying bases of
the Council's decision were outside the scope of the Data Protection Directive,
the agreement had no appropriate legal basis and was, accordingly, annulled.82
E. July 23, 2007: A New Agreement Is Reached
Because of the ECJ's May 30, 2006 decision, the United States and the
European Union rushed to reach an interim agreement and did so in October
Parliament. In addition, Parliament's assent is required for certain important decisions, such as
allowing new countries to join the EU." Id
76. European Court of Justice, supra note 75.
77. Joined Cases C-317 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. 1-4721, 1-4828 to
29, 1-4831 to 32; see also Press Release, Court of Justice of the European Cmtys., Advocate
General Leger Proposes Annulment of the Commission and Council Decisions on Transfer to the
American Authorities of Personal Information Concerning Air Passengers (Nov. 22, 2005),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/en/actu/communiques/cp05/aff/cp5OO98en.pdf (announcing
and summarizing the opinion of Advocate General Leger); Advocate General European Court
Rejects PNR Deal, EUR. DIGITAL RTS. (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number
3.24/PNR (noting that Advocate General Leger advised annulment of the European Union/United
States agreement). The ECJ did not address the ultra vires or fundamental-rights infringement
claims, but annulled the decision based on the adequacy of assurances from the United States. Id.
at 1-4829, 1-4831 to 32.
78. Id. at 1-4834.
79. Joined Cases C-317 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-4828; see also
Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 25, art. 3, at 39 ("This Directive shall not apply to the
processing of personal data: in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of
Community law, . . . and in any case to processing operations concerning public security [or]
defen[c]e .... ).
80. Joined Cases C-317 & C-318/04, Parliament v. Council, 2006 E.C.R. at 1-4828.
81. Id. at 1-4830.
82. Id. at 1-4831 to 32.
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2006.83 The interim agreement had an expiration date of July 31, 2007, giving
the United States and the European Union less than one year to reach a formal
agreement that complied with the ECJ ruling.84 On July 26, 2007, a mere five
days before the interim agreement expired, a Revised Agreement was
finalized.
Accompanying the Revised Agreement was a "letter by [the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security] giving assurances on the way it intended to
protect PNR data . . . ."8 Additionally, the Revised Agreement required a
"'reply letter from the [European Union] . . .confirming that on the basis of the
assurances, it consider[ed] the level of protection of PNR data in the United
States as adequate.' 87
In order to comply with the ECJ decision, the European Union changed the
legal basis for the agreements-first in the Interim Agreement and then in the
final Revised Agreement." The original basis for the first agreement was the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, or the "first pillar," which the
ECJ rejected.89 The new legal reasoning was based on the Treaty on European
83. Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security, 2006 O.J. (L 298) 29, 29-31 [hereinafter Interim
Agreement], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:
298:0029:0031 :EN:PDF. The agreement was finalized at Luxembourg on October 16, 2006, and
at Washington, D.C. on October 19, 2006. Id
84. Id. at 30; see also News Release, Delegation of the Eur. Comm'n to the USA, EU and
US Reach Agreement on the Continued Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data (Oct. 6,
2006), http://www.eurunion.org/News/press/2006/20060086.htm. The Council adopted the
Interim Agreement on October 16, 2006. Council Decision 2006/729/CFSP/JHA, on the Signing,
on Behalf of the European Union, of an Agreement Between the European Union and the United
States of America on the Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air
Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, 2006 O.J. (L 298) 27, 27-28
(EU).
85. Agreement Between the European Union and the United States of America on the
Processing and Transfer of Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), 2007 O.J. (L 204) 18,
18-20 [hereinafter Revised Agreement], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ
/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:204:0018:0025:EN:PDF. The European Union signed the
agreement on July 23, 2007, in Brussels and the United States on July 26, 2007, in Washington,
D.C. Id
86. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 5/2007 on the Follow-Up Agreement
Between the European Union and the United States ofAmerica on the Processing and Transfer of
Passenger Name Record (PNR) Data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of
Homeland Security Concluded in July 2007, at 5 (Aug. 17, 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wpl 38_en.pdf.
87. Id at 837-38 (internal quotation marks omitted). The new agreement is set to expire in
seven years unless both parties agree to extend or replace it, or one party decides to terminate the
agreement. Revised Agreement, supra note 85, at 19.
88. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 838; see Revised Agreement, supra note 85, at 18;
Interim Agreement, supra note 83, at 29.
89. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 838.
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Union, or the "third pillar."90  "As a result [of the change], the Revised
Agreement now falls under the competence of the European Union, as opposed
to the European Community."9'
Although the Revised Agreement did not provide all the safeguards the
European Parliament insisted upon, it did incorporate several significant
insurance provisions that were absent from the original agreement.92 "For
instance, the Revised Agreement extend[ed] the privacy protections found in
the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of Information Act to non-U.S.
citizens and provided] a system of redress for persons seeking information
about . . . PNR[s]."9 The Revised Agreement also provided assurances from
the United States that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would
"'provide to airlines a form of notice concerning PNR collection and redress
practices to be available for public display [and] . . . w[ould] work with
interested parties in the aviation industry to promote greater visibility of this
notice. Finally, the Revised Agreement adopt[ed] the 'push' system of
transmitting PNR," discussed in detail below.94
III. BALANCING COUNTERVAILING POSITIONS
Not long after the Revised Agreement was signed, critics started opining on
its legality and possible legal challenges.95 Interestingly, before the ink was
dry on the Revised Agreement, the European Union started drafting its own
internal PNR-sharing law; this, too, has raised serious legal questions.96
Beyond these challenges are the two threshold questions at issue here: 1) Do
PNR transfers increase national security and, if they do, is the legal wrangling
concerning PNR transfers jeopardizing that security; and 2) Has a proper
balance been struck between privacy and national security concerns with
regards to PNR transfers?
90. Id.; see Revised Agreement, supra note 85, at 18-19; Interim Agreement, supra note 83,
at 29-30; see also Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, arts. 1-2, Dec. 24,
2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 5.




95. See, e.g., VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 838; Letter from Peter Hustinx, Eur. Data.
Prot. Supervisor, to Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, Minister for the Interior, Ger. (June 27, 2007) (on
file with author).
96. Memorandum on Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger
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A. New Challenges
Although the July 23, 2007 agreement increased some privacy protections
over PNRs, many critics argue that the Revised Agreement abated protections
in other areas.97 First, the Revised Agreement nearly quintuples the time the
United States can retain PNR information from three and one-half years to
fifteen years.9 Second, DHS may now use PNR information pertaining to
race, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, union membership, health, and
even an individual's sex life.99 Finally, critics of the new agreement argue
that, although the Revised Agreement reduced the number of data inquiries
from thirty-four to nineteen, the "change is a mere subterfuge as the Revised
Agreement groups all but one of the thirty-four elements into one of nineteen
new data sets."'
Also, the Revised Agreement appears to solve the push-pull debate, in which
the "pull" method allows U.S. authorities access to airline reservation systems,
and the "push" method permits airlines to send requested information to U.S.
authorities.10 Yet, critics of the agreement contend that this fix is a gambit.102
Additionally, there is concern that the United States will suspend the ability
of European air carriers to operate in U.S. air space, thus pressuring airlines to
abide by other requests, even those that are outside the scope of the Revised
Agreement. 103
97. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 837-39, 858-59.
98. Id The agreement also contains a provision to extend the retention time past the fifteen-
year mark. Id.
Under the Revised Agreement, data is stored in an active analytical database for seven
years and then moved to dormant, non-operational status for eight years, where it can
be "accessed only with approval of a senior [Department of Homeland Security]
official . . . and only in response to an identifiable case, threat, or risk. After the fifteen
year period has expired, the Department of Homeland Security expects that the data
will be deleted, and the Revised Agreement states that "questions of whether and when
to destroy PNR data .. . will be addressed . .. as part of future discussions."
Id. at 839 n.82 (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 839.
100. Id Critics also argue that "the Revised Agreement requires the airlines to transfer new
PNR data that were not required under the previous agreements, including additional baggage and
frequent flyer information." Id.
101. Id. at 838; see also Proposal for a Council Framework Decision of 6 November 2007 on
the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for Law Enforcement Purposes, EUROPA, [hereinafter
EU PNR Proposal], http://europa.eu/legislation summaries/justicefreedom security/
fight against terrorism/114584_en.htm (last updated May 2008). The push method is "the
method under which air carriers transmit the required PNR data into the database of the authority
requesting them," and the pull method is a "method under which the authority requiring the data
can access the air carrier's reservation system and extract a copy of the required data into their
database." Id.
102. See VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 838-39 (arguing that despite the safeguards
incorporated into the Revised Agreement, the agreement still does not "adequately provide
privacy protections").
103. Id. at 858-59.
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Although formal legal action has not been initiated against the Revised
Agreement, such an action may be on the horizon. In an official report to
Congress, the Library of Congress's Congressional Research Service opined
that "European Parliamentarians and European civil liberty and privacy groups
may still challenge the new July 2007 PNR agreement."l 04 Moreover, the
report points out that the PNR debate has heightened general European concern
with data security. 05
In a press release, the European Parliament stated that the Revised
Agreement is substantially flawed and fails to protect citizens' personal data.106
Similarly, Peter Hustinx, the European Data Protection Supervisor, has "grave
concem[s]" that he detailed in a letter to Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, Germany's
Minister for the Interior.'0 7 Specifically, Mr. Hustinx is distressed over the
following issues:
The extension of the time that passenger data are kept-effectively
from 3,5 [sic] to 15 years in all cases-introducing a concept of
"dormant" data that is without legal precedent;
Data on EU citizens will be readily accessible to a broad range of US
agencies and there is no limitation to what US authorities are allowed
to do with the data;
The absence of a robust legal mechanism that enables EU citizens to
challenge misuse of their personal information; [and]
The US wants to avoid a binding agreement by exchange of
letters.10 8
In what appears as a precursor to formal litigation, the Members of the
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe made an article 255 request, the
European equivalent of a Freedom of Information Act request, for "all the
documents related to . . . the negotiation of the 2007 Agreement between the
European Union and the United States of America on the processing and
transfer of passenger name record[s] . . . as well as [access] to the documents
related to the confidentiality of negotiations documents."' 09
104. KRISTIN ARCHICK, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS 22030, U.S.-EU COOPERATION
AGAINST TERRORISM 5 (2007).
105. Id.
106. European Parliament Resolution of 12 July 2007 on the PNR Agreement with the
United States of America, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/get
Doc.do?pubRef--//EP//TEXT+TA+P6-TA-2007-0347+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (last updated
Mar. 18, 2008).
107. Letter from Peter Hustinx to Dr. Wolfgang Schauble, supra note 95.
108. Id.
109. Letter from Members of the Alliance of Liberals & Democrats for Eur., to Eur. Union
Council and the Eur. Union Comm'n (Sept. 11, 2007) (on file with author).
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European organizations were not the only ones unsettled by the Revised
Agreement.' 10 Indeed, in a letter to Michael Chertoff, the former Secretary of
the U.S. DHS, the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations (AFL-CIQ) expressed "concerns about the possible collection
and retention of information indicating the union affiliation of air passengers
and the use of that information to determine whether a person poses a terrorism
security risk."111 The AFL-CIO went on to reject the idea that union affiliation
has any bearing on whether an individual is a security threat." 2 Consequently,
the AFL-CIO requested that the Department "state clearly that it will not
collect information on union membership and will ensure that this information
is deleted from PNR data before it is transferred to DHS."13
Despite the criticism, there was an immediate response from the leadership
within the European Union and from the DHS supporting the PNR agreement
after the failed terrorist attack on December 25, 2009.114 Specifically, the two
sovereigns released U.S.-EU Joint Declaration on Aviation Security on January
21, 2010."s The Declaration stated that the European Union, the European
Commission, and the Secretary of the DHS, Janet Napolitano, met in Toledo,
Spain, and "discussed current terrorists threats, in particular the attempted
attack on an aircraft approaching Detroit on 25th December 2009, ways to
strengthen international security measures and standards for aviation security,
and an upcoming global dialogue on securing international travel."" 6  The
group declared that the "last attempted attack on 25th December by an
individual who flew from Africa to the United States via Europe highlights the
international nature of this threat. An international threat demands an
international response."" 7  Among other countermeasures, the meeting
participants agreed to "[c]ontinue the excellent cooperation between the EU
and the United States on aviation security issues based on the EU-U.S. Air
Transport Agreement."" 8 In addition, the parties agreed that the European
Union and the United States should draw on the lessons learned from the
Revised Agreement and continue to review how the "use of passenger
information in the prevention of terrorism in considering what and how
operational cooperation sharing could be further improved and compatible
110. Letter from John J. Sweeny, President, AFL-CIO, & Edward Wytkind, President,
Transp. Trades Dep't, AFL-CIO, to Michael Chertoff, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Oct.




114. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S.-EU Joint Declaration on Aviation
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approaches could be developed among partners committed to aviation security,
the rule of law, and international humans rights."" 9
In the EU-U.S. Joint Statement on Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in
the Area of Justice, Freedom and Security, the commitment to the PNR
agreement was also reinforced. 120 In this declaration, the PNR agreement was
touted as a success, and the European Union and United States committed to
"undertake joint reviews of the agreement in order to assure the effective
operation and privacy and personal data protection of [their] respective
systems for collecting and analyzing such data."l 2 1  However, though the
official statements seem to indicate that the PNR agreement is not in jeopardy,
the European Union and individual nations within the Union have taken steps
that directly call into question the future of this important agreement. 2
Germany recently took such a step when its constitutional court overturned a
2008 law.123 The law, designed to combat terrorism and serious crimes
required communications data to be stored for six months.' 24 In its decision to
overturn the law, the court ordered the deletion of the vast amounts of stored
data, statin that the "law [w]as a 'particularly serious infringement of
privacy."'l2
Even more troubling to supporters of the PNR agreement is the EU
Parliament's recent rejection of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program
(TFTP).126 Many in the national-security arena believe this is not only a major
blow to U.S.-EU relations, but that it also makes both sovereigns less safe. 7
In fact, in a plea to the EU Parliament before it voted 378 to 196 to reject the
agreement, the U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence, Stuart Levy, wrote to the Parliament arguing that rejecting the law
would make citizens in both the United States and the European Union less
safe.128 Mr. Levy stated,
119. Id.
120. Joint Statement, European Union & U.S., Enhancing Transatlantic Cooperation in the




122. See, e.g., German Court Orders Data Deletion, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8545772.stm; Teri Schultz, European Parliament Resoundingly
Rejects U.S. Counterterrorism Program, MINNPOST.COM (Feb. 12, 2010), www.minn
post.com/globalpost/2010/02/12/15877/european_parliament resoundinglyrejectsUS counterte
rroism program.
123. German Court Orders Data Deletion, supra note 122.
124. Id
125. Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Schultz, supra note 122.
127. Id. ("'It's not a high moment in U.S.-EU relations,' said Cristina Gallach, the
spokeswoman for the Spanish government in its six-month stint in the rotating presidency.").
128. Stuart Levy, Op-Ed, The European Parliament Takes the Stage on Counter-Terrorism,
DER STANDARD, Feb. 5, 2010, http://austria.USembassy.gov/levey2.htm ("A veto of this interim
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The TFTP has been instrumental in protecting the citizens of the
United States and Europe, and it has played a key role in multiple
terrorism investigations on both sides of the Atlantic. To take but
one example, TFTP information provided substantial assistance to
European governments during investigations into the Al Qaeda-
directed plot to attack transatlantic airline flights traveling between
the EU and the United States. TFTP information provided new
leads, corroborated identities, and revealed relationships among
individuals responsible for this terrorist plot. In September 2009,
three individuals were convicted in the UK, and each was sentenced
to at least thirty years in prison.' 29
Mr. Levy concluded his op-ed by arguing that rejecting the TFTP would
handicap the ability of both the United States and the European Union to track
and prevent terrorism, and that losing the TFTP would be a "regrettable and
potentially tragic mistake."' 30
Despite the precarious status of the U.S.-EU agreement, a possible EU PNR
law is on the horizon, though it likely faces challenges.
B. New Laws?
On November 6, 2008, the European Commission tendered a proposal to
establish a PNR system and collect personal data on everyone flying into and
out of EU member states.'3 1 The new law, if enacted, will require data that "is
almost exactly the same as that being collected under the controversial EU-US
PNR scheme."l 3 2 The data that is collected will be retained as "active" for five
agreement would jeopardize a valuable and carefully constructed program that has helped make
our citizens safer.").
129. Id. Mr. Levy also commented that "[u]ndetected and undeterred, terrorists will abuse
the integrity and openness of the world's financial system. The benefits of the Terrorist Finance
Tracking Program have been incalculable in enhancing the safety and well-being of European and
American citizens." Id.
130. Id.
131. PNR Scheme, supra note 11.
132. Id. The data collected under the new law includes:
(1) PNR record locator; (2) Date of reservation/issue of ticket; (3) Date(s) of intended
travel; (4) Name (s) [sic]; (5) Address and Contact information (telephone number, e-
mail address); (6) All forms of payment information, including billing address; (7) All
travel itinerary for specific PNR; (8) Frequent flyer information; (9) Travel agency
/Travel agent [sic]; (10) Travel status of passenger including confirmations, check-in
status, no show or go show information; (11) Split/Divided PNR information; (12)
General remarks (excluding sensitive information); (13) Ticketing field information,
including ticket number, date of ticket issuance and one-way tickets, Automated Ticket
Fare Quote fields; (14) Seat number and other seat information; (15) Code share
information; (16) All baggage information; (17) Number and other names of travellers
[sic] on PNR; (18) Any collected API information; and (19) All historical changes to
the PNR listed in numbers I to 18.
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years, whereas the Revised Agreement with the United States provides that
data will be retained for seven years.' 33 Both the Revised Agreement and the
proposed law, however, provide that data may be kept for eight additional
"dormant" years after the active period.134 Thus, the United States could hold
data for a total of fifteen ears under the Revised Agreement and thirteen under
the proposed EU law. 13 And, as noted, the actual information collected is
virtually identical to the information collected under the Revised
Agreement. 136
The European Union's Interior Ministers have already given their support of
the proposed law. 137 The official motivation, according to the Commission's
impact assessment, for the EU PNR law was twofold:
[A]n EU-wide PNR system would improve security by, in particular,
preventing changing of travel patterns of passengers to Member
States with no PNR and enhancing information exchange between
Member States.
[I]ncrease legal certainty and reduce costs for air carriers by fostering
common standards for transmission of PNR data and by preventing
distortions of competition arising from possible differences in
various national PNR requirements incumbent on carriers.' 38
According to the European Union Home Affairs Commissioner, Jacques
Barrot, the plan was to have the law passed and running by the end of 2009 .139
Despite the support from the Commission and the Interior Ministers, the new
Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for
Law Enforcement Purposes, Annex I, at 24, COM (2007) 654 final (Oct. 22, 2007),
available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2007/oct/eu-com-pnr-proposal.pdf. In addition, "for
unaccompanied minors under 18 years," the PNR includes: "(1) Name and gender of child; (2)
Age; (3) Language(s) spoken; (4) Name and contact details of guardian on departure and
relationship to the child; (5) Name and contact details of guardian on arrival and relationship to
the child; and (6) Departure and arrival agent." Id. After 9/11, the United States initially required
up to forty-three categories of information for PNRs. Nolan, supra note 13, at 4; see also supra
Part II.B (discussing the ATSA).
133. PNR Scheme, supra note 11.
134. Id
135. Id.
136. See note 132 and accompanying text.
137. Renata Goldirova, EU Endorses Idea of Collecting Air Passenger Data,
EUOBSERVER.COM (July 25, 2008, 09:16 CET), available at http://euobserver.
com/9/26539?print-l.
138. Informal JHA Council, Proposal for a Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger
Name Record (PNR) for Law Enforcement Purposes, at 2 (Jan. 25/26, 2009) [hereinafter JHA
Council Report] (on file with author).
139. Id ("According to the ministerial deal, a number of working groups will be set up in
order to look into different aspects of the proposal-including what exact information should be
captured and whether the data should come only from foreigners flying to Europe or all
passengers.").
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scheme has come under attack from the European Parliament. 140 Specifically,
the European Parliament issued a press release on November 20, 2008, stating
that it "stands against a plan to collect air passenger records for law
enforcement purposes that could pose a threat to privacy."'41 Moreover, the
Parliament adopted a resolution by an overwhelming majority that criticized
the Commission's proposal.14 2 Additionally, the members of the Parliament
found that "the measure [wa]s not justified legally, as well as in terms of
effectiveness in the fight against terrorism. They ask[ed] for evidence that
such a system would be useful at EU level, and could not vote on the text until
their many concerns ha[d] been addressed."'1
43
These comments from the European Parliament have been given a whole
new meaning with the passage and implantation of the Lisbon Treaty. Before
the EU PNR law could go into effect, it was put on hold because the potential
enactment of the new Lisbon Treaty.144 The European Union's member states
quickly signed the Treaty on December 13, 2007, and it went into force on
December 1, 2009. 145 The Treaty created significant changes, including
granting more power for the European Parliament in legislative issues, giving
them "equal footing" with the Council of Ministers; redistributing "voting
weights between the member states"; and prohibiting the use of national vetoes
for certain topics.1 46
This new "role" for the European Parliament is significant with regards to
PNR transfers because Members of the Parliament have been very critical of
both the United States' and the European Union's PNR transfer agreements.147
140. Press Release, European Parliament, MEPs Voice Serious Criticism at EU PNR Scheme




142. Id. (noting that the resolution was adopted with "512 votes in [favor], 5 against and 19
abstentions").
143. Id.
144. Press Release, Passenger Name Record Talks on Hold, supra note 12.
145. Eur. Comm'n, European Commission Welcomes the Entry into Force of the Treaty of
Lisbon, EUROPA (Dec. 1, 2009), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference
=IP/09/1855&format-HT.
146. Q&A: The Lisbon Treaty, BBC NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/6901353.stm; see also European Parliament & the Lisbon Treaty, EUROPA,
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=66 (last visited Oct. 12,
2010) ("The Lisbon Treaty now places Parliament on an equal footing with the Council of
Ministers in deciding on the vast majority of EU laws.").
147. Press Release, Passenger Name Record Talks on Hold, supra note 12 ("On several
occasions, MEPs voiced serious criticism of the proposed EU PNR scheme, a plan to collect air
passenger records for law enforcement purposes, 'essentially copying a scheme applied in the
US'....").
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To date, because of the Lisbon Treaty, there has not been any real movement
on the European PNR law.148
U.S. national-security officials are concerned that, because the PNR
agreement was not fully ratified before the Lisbon Treaty took effect, that
agreement, as with the TFTP agreement, may be in trouble.14 9 Indeed,
commentators on U.S./EU privacy relations believe that the PNR agreement
may be next in Parliament's cross-hairs.150 One such commentator recently
stated that the "European Parliament is already beginning to consider whether
to ratify another . . . 'agreement' . . . [on] Passenger Name Records (PNRs)
containing airline reservations and other travel data."' 5 ' That, as with the
TFPT, the Lisbon Treaty has given Parliament new power that it is willing to
use, and that the TFTP and PNR agreement share similar histories-
specifically that Parliament has resisted them since their conception-indicates
that the PNR agreements may be threatened.152 In addition, U.S. government
officials are worried that the agreement may come under attack from
Parliament.153 Ivan Fong, General Counsel for the DHS, was recently asked at
a national-security conference whether the PNR scheme was in jeopardy
because of the Lisbon Treaty and the Parliament's past criticism of the PNR-
sharing agreement.154 Mr. Fong answered that, although Europeans and the
United States view privacy differently, "I'm an optimist, I think we can bridge
some of those differences. I think we share many of the same end goals."
However, Mr. Fong went on to say that "recent events suggest that there is
some risk that the PNR sharing agreements that we have will have to be
revisited in the light of the current and recent actions."l56
C Balancing Security ofData with Security ofa Nation
The fundamental objective of the European Union, since the adoption of the
Treaty of Amsterdam, "has been to provide citizens with a high level of
security within an area of freedom . . . and justice."' 57  Since the terrorist
attacks of September 1 Ith, the attacks in Madrid and London, and the most
recent attempted Christmas-Day attack on Flight 253 (originating in Europe),
148. Id.
149. See European Parliament Rejects Deal for US Access to SWIFT Financial Data. Next






153. See, e.g., Fong, supra note 9 (acknowledging that the agreement may be in jeopardy of
being overturned).
154. Id. The author of this Article asked Mr. Fong this question.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. NOLAN, supra note 13, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the European Union has earnestly increased its efforts to provide security and
liberty to its citizens.1s Yet, under the guise of the war on terror, many argue
that the European Union, under pressure from the United States, has placed a
greater emphasis on physical security, while neglecting privacy security. 59
Indeed, guarding fundamental freedoms while simultaneously rotecting
national security and the lives of the citizenry is not easy to balance. o Critics
of the European Union's current approach contend that looking at "PNR
transfer as an example of the EU's adoption of counter-terrorism polices, does
not instill confidence in the EU's commitment to ensuring that its approach in
tackling terrorism is reconciled with respect for the fundamental freedoms
which form the basis of our civili[z]ation."l61 These critics also argue that
"freedoms of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data
were ignored in the case of PNR data transfer [and] is an issue of grave
concern for the EU citizen."l62 These criticisms are similar to those in the
United States, where commentators argue that the PNR-transfer agreement
does not adequately "protect the privacy of airline passengers, that the United
States should adopt stricter privacy laws, and that it is further necessary to
establish an international standard for the global protection of airline passenger
data."l 63
However, in order to successfully fight terrorism, nations must seize the
opportunity to identify terrorists and other international criminals during one of
the few occasions when they must expose themselves to the international
community-when they board an aircraft.164 This was the very case with
Mutallab, who was on the international radar because of warnings from his
father, but whose whereabouts were unknown until he stepped on Northwest
Airlines Flight 253.165
Recognition of this opportunity is the motivation behind the United States,
and now the potential new European Union, laws regarding PNR transfers.166
Identifying these individuals through information provided to the airlines
unquestionably has challenges. Mr. Chertoff, when speaking as the Secretary
of Homeland Security, stated that the United States receives ninety-one million
158. Id.
159. Id
160. Id. at 11.
161. Id. (internal quotation makes omitted).
162. Id at 12.
163. Arnulf S. Gubitz, Note, The U.S. Aviation and Transportation Security Act of2001 in
Conflict with the E. U. Data Protection Laws: How Much Access to Airline Passenger Data Does
the United States Need to Combat Terrorism?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 431, 433 (2005).
164. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 864.
165. Yusfus Alli, Mutallab's Father Accepts to Testify in US, THE NATION, Jan. 17, 2010,
http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/32848/1/Mutallabs-father-accepts-to-testify-in-
US/Pagel.html; Labott et al., supra note 7.
166. See VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 864.
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travelers by air each year.167 The good news, Secretary Chertoff pointed out,
"is that only a tiny handful might pose a genuine threat; the bad news is that,
given modem technology, it only takes a few to wreak untold havoc."' 68
Thus, while the United States possesses "terrorist watch lists that identify
people we know to be dangerous, we need to find individuals who are terrorists
but are not yet known to us. The question is how best to do it without takin
the kinds of draconian measures that would shut down travel altogether."'
The former Secretary identified data mining as a key area to combat these
terrorists. 170 He cited to the European Union's PNR agreement as an important
tool because, "[b]y collecting just a few key pieces of non-sensitive,
commercial information, we can identify the small number of passengers who
warrant a closer look before they board a plane or enter our country."'
Data-mining has had some success: In April 2006 at Boston's Logan
Airport, two arriving passengers exhibited travel patterns indicating "high-risk
behaviors" and so Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers decided to
take a closer look at them. In the "secondary interview" process, one subject
stated that he was traveling to America on business for a group suspected of
having financial ties to Al Qaeda. When his baggage was examined, officers
discovered images of armed men, one of them labeled "Mujahadin." Both
passengers were refused entry to the United States.
Three years earlier, on the basis of such data and other analytics, an
inspector at Chicago's O'Hare Airport pulled aside an individual for
secondary questioning. When his answers did not satisfy the security
officers, he was denied U.S. entry - but not before his finger-prints
had been taken. The next time we saw those fingerprints or rather
parts of them, they were on the steering wheel of a suicide vehicle
that blew up and killed 32 people in Iraq.17 2
Despite the advantages of data mining, Secretary Chertoff recognized during
his tenure at the DHS that critics saw the tactic of data mining passenger
information "as evidence that the United States is grabbing every available
piece of information, acting like Big Brother and acting alone in this manner
on the world stage." 73 At the same time, however, Secretary Chertoff asserted
that the United States, and other democratic countries that have implemented
similar programs concerning PNR transfers, understand the value of privacy
and balance the need for data security with the need for national security.174
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The EU Commissioner, Franco Frattini, has echoed Secretary Chertoff's
position.'75 When speaking on the draft EU PNR law, Commissioner Frattini
stated that it would be "strange if we didn't then also concern ourselves with
Europeans' security."1 76  These are important words from Commissioner
Frattini who has been an outspoken advocate on the importance of privacy
security.
However, not everyone agrees with Secretary Chertoff that PNR transfers
increase national security.178 The Members of the European Parliament (MEP)
have stated that "no evidence [exists] of the usefulness of the mass collection
and use of PNR data for counter terrorism purposes... .,,179
Addressing the new EU PNR law, the MEP argue that, because the law has
"a considerable impact on the personal life sphere of European citizens," the
fact that it may or may not increase security is not sufficient. so Ultimately, the
175. EU Must Store Data on Its Own Frontier Entries, Too-Commissioner Frattini Says,
EUR. AFFAIRS (2008), http://www.europeaninstitute.org/Winter/Spring-2008/transatlantic-
convergence-passenger-data-questions.html.
176. Id
177. See Franco Frattini, European Comm'r Responsible for Justice, Freedom & Sec.,
Closing Speech on Public Security, Privacy and Technology (Nov. 20, 2007), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/07/7 28 (follow "PDF: EN"
hyperlink).
178. See Press Release, MEPs Voice Serious Criticism, supra note 140.
179. Id The Parliament does acknowledge that PNR transfers do "provide evidence of its
usefulness for other purposes, as well as the value of using PNR on a case-by-case basis in the
context of ongoing investigations, and on the basis of a warrant and with due cause." Id.
180. See id. The MEPs also note that "the European Court of Justice already challenged the
EU-US PNR agreement on this ground. They therefore decide[d] to reserve their formal opinion
on the framework-decision once their concerns have been addressed." Id Additionally, a
commission of the European Council charged with "present[ing] a common EU approach on the
use of passenger data for law enforcement purposes" offered the following discussion on the
necessity of a standard European PNR system:
Is processing of PNR data useful and needed to effectively increase security in the EU?
On the basis of the experience gained, for example, in the USA and the UK, we should
be able to establish whether the proposal is necessary for the purpose sought, i.e. to
effectively increase the level of security in the fight against terrorism and organised
[sic] crime, in particular in view of the possible interference with civil liberties.
[]Is there a need for an EU PNR system?
Action on the EU level should be necessary and should present advantages over no EU
action scenario, where some Member States would put in place their national PNR
systems. The EU added value could be perceived from the security, business and data
protection perspective.
As to security, it remains open whether national PNR systems could provide for a
sufficient coverage of passenger flows and an efficient exchange of information
between Member States' competent authorities. National approaches may also lead to
changes in travel patterns of passengers towards the EU Member States which do not
process PNR data.
From the business perspective, a set of diverging national PNR systems could also be
perceived inferior to an EU system in terms of administrative costs, legal certainty and
level playing field.
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MEP question the conditions that make the new PNR law necessary and
express concern that "the proposal would give authorities warrantless access to
all data while their added value for law-enforcement purposes has not been
proved, as there is no evidence that PNR data are useful for massive profiling
or data mining in order to seek potential terrorists." 81 To balance privacy with
national security, MEP argue that the European Union's PNR law should be
used only "on a case-by-case basis, in the context of ongoing
investigations."l 82 But this raises the obvious question of who determines if a
certain situation meets whatever "need" threshold has been established? Does
a tribunal of some type make this determination? Does the sovereign nation in
which the airplane is landing make this determination or does the nation from
where the airplane departed? Is not the whole point of automatic PNR data
transfers to keep up the national security need of fast intelligence? All of these
questions point to the central problem with a case-by-case approach to PNR
data sharing-unanswered questions of who and when?
Furthermore, the many member states and other pertinent organizations
contend that, in the event that PNR information is used by law enforcement, it
should be for the limited scope of preventing terrorism and defeating organized
crime.183 If the field is too broadly defined, they argue, "the interference with
the right to privacy is no longer justified by the ends it seeks to achieve. On
the other hand, if the field of use is defined too narrowly, its contribution to the
public security can be insignificant."l84 In essence, all parties to this
deliberation argue that privacy must be balanced with security; the question to
be answered, and the question that will continue to ignite debates, is where the
line should be drawn.
In the end, this is a difficult issue with no bright-line rules to give easy
answers. However, what is clear is that the less the international community
cooperates, the less safe the world will be; the less intelligence that is shared,
the less safe the world will be; the more bureaucratic hoops that are made, the
From the data protection perspective, an EU instrument guarantees that the passenger
data gathered are subject to harmonised [sic] data protection rules throughout the
European Union.
JHA Council Report, supra note 138, at 3.
181. Press Release, MEPs Voice Serious Criticism, supra note 140. MEPs suggest that
"better results could be obtained by improving mutual legal assistance between law enforcement
authorities." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, MEPs advocate that the "new
legislation should include a sunset clause and estimate that the need for action at the community
level has not been sufficiently demonstrated, nor the proportionality of the measure." Id
182. Id. "MEPs also say the proposal should also create a burden for air carriers, and that
they should not be required to collect additional data or be made responsible to verify the
records." Id
183. Commission Staff Working Document, Accompanying Document to the Proposal for a
Council Framework Decision on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for Law Enforcement
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less safe the world will be; and the more time and resources that are spent on
meeting artificial legal requirements, the less safe the world will be.
IV. CONCLUSION
One of the first things that DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano did after the
attempted terrorist attack on Christmas Day 2009 was to fly to Europe and talk
to EU transportation authorities.'8 The purpose of her trip, among other
issues, was to emphasize how important PNR information is to the United
States and to emphasize to the world that the United States takes security
seriously.1 However, in a time when the United States and the rest of the
international community are constantly reminded of the threat that terrorism
leaves at the world's doorstep-the most recent reminder being this past
Christmas Day-and when "exceptionalism" has become the norm, the world
must be vigilant to assure that liberty is not compromised in the name of safety
in the effort to wage this important war on terror. 187 It is not entirely clear if
the original U.S.-EU PNR agreement or any changes to the PNR agreement
now or in the future would have impacted December 25, 2009; what is clear,
however, is that this incident reinforced how important the information is.
Striking the proper balance between privacy and a country's need to protect
national security has been an extremely contentious issue since the attacks on
September 11, 2001. It was not long after 9/11 that Congress passed
legislation that bolstered national security. 89 "Laws such as the Patriot Act
bartered privacy interests for the promise of increased security. With the
passage of time, however, these nationalistic sentiments have decreased. Civil
liberty advocates are now questioning the necessity and effectiveness of
national security measures that infringe upon privacy rights." 90
185. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., U.S.-EU Joint Declaration on Aviation
Security (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1264119013
71 0.shtm.
186. Id.
187. NOLAN, supra note 13, at 12.
The role of national democratically elected parliaments, the European Parliament and
civil rights commentators has arguably never been more important.
As Den Boer and Monar warned us, we need to be careful that counter-terrorism efforts
within the EU do not 'contribute to a complete domination of EU justice and home
affairs by an all-encompassing security rationale..[sic](which) if left unchecked, . . . .
[sic] could ultimately reduce one of the most ambitious political projects of the EU of
recent years, the 'area of freedom, security and justice', [sic] to that of a mere
integrated law enforcement zone'. [sic]
Id
188. Irfan Tukdi, Comment, Transatlantic Turbulence: The Passenger Name Record
Conflict, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 587, 619 (2008).
189. Id
190. Id (footnote omitted).
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However, the act of transferring PNR data does not compromise the privacy
rights of citizens of the world to the level that completely abandoning the
current PNR regime would reduce the security it provides. PNR transfers
appropriately focus on identifying suspected terrorists and international
criminals when they expose themselves to the international community.191 It is
true that, if the objective is to eliminate all risk, it is a quixotic goal; thus,
nations instead must endeavor to manage their risk.192 This is important
because nations that pursue complete risk elimination ultimately seem to harm
the very thing they were trying to protect.193  The United States "could
eliminate every risk to our airliners by shutting down our airports, but that
would hand the terrorists a victory by destroying air travel-just what the
terrorists were trying to achieve in the first place by attacking our airliners."' 94
As such, both the United States and the European Union must strike a
careful balance between tracking down terrorists and international criminals,
and the protection of privacy rights. 195 The saying that the ends never justify
the means only holds true if one is alive to criticize the means.
191. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 865.
192. Chertoff, supra note 14.
193. Id
194. Id
195. VanWasshnova, supra note 1, at 865.
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